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BETTING ON THE FUTURE- HOW TO KEEP NBA GAMES LEGITIMATE
BY: THOMAS STEWART
I.

INTRODUCTION

Sports betting is a controversial topic in the United States: a fun way to spice up athletic events
to some, an immoral habit draining the bank accounts of hard -working Americans to others.1
However, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy, and the ever-expanding list of states
legalizing sports betting, it appears that sports betting is here to stay.2 The advent of legalized
sports betting, however, carries with it serious questions regarding the integrity of the games that
people are betting on, as sports betting can expose athletes and athletic contests to improper
external influences.3 Widespread debates involving regulation, integrity fees, and data sourcing
are particularly relevant in basketball, especially regarding the National Basketball Association
(NBA).4 This paper begins with a background of the history of sports betting in general, with a
focus on sports betting and point-shaving scandals in American basketball; explores shifting
attitudes and legal dynamics surrounding the legalization of sports betting from the perspective of
both the public and professional sports leagues; discusses what makes basketball so susceptible to
negative external influences in the context of sports betting; and explains the roles of state
regulations, integrity watchdogs, integrity fees, and data streams with regards to maintaining the
integrity of NBA games. The paper then argues that the best way to maintain the integrity of NBA
games is through continued state regulation, a competitive data bidding process in each state rather

1

Christopher C. Schwarz, Has the Supreme Court's Sports Gambling Decision Opened the Door for Corruption in
Esports?, N.J. Law., February 2021, at 49.
2 Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484-85 (2018).
3 Daniel J. Spitz and Ryan P. Terry, We Can Handle It: Advocating in Support of State Legislation of Legal Sports
Gambling Post-Murphy v. NCAA, 30 J. Legal Aspects Sport 153, 160 (2020).
4 John Holden and Mike Schuster, The Sham of Integrity Fees in Sports Betting, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 31, 39 (2019).
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than paying integrity fees to the NBA, and for the continued utilization of integrity watchdogs to
detect betting irregularities.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. History of US Sports Betting and its Initial Icy Reception
The United States has a long and complicated history with wagering on professional sports,
but gambling itself stretches as far back as the Paleolithic Period. 5 During the colonial days in
America, the colonies utilized lotteries to generate revenue when there was no federal
government.6 Once the lotteries were outlawed, underground sports betting became prevalent in
the 1800s, with betters focusing on horse races.7 In the early decades of the 20th century, the focus
of sports betting shifted to baseball, which led to the infamous “Black Sox” scandal of 1919.8 This
scandal involved the Chicago White Sox intentionally sabotaging the World Series in exchange
for money from a crime boss.9 Baseball’s woes continued when Pete Rose, the all-time leader in
hits in MLB history, was caught betting on his own team.10
Congress, aware of the growing illegal sports betting market, attempted to regulate it by
passing the Revenue Act of 1951, which legalized betting at a federal level but required that
gamblers report their betting to the federal government for tax purposes.11 However, as organized
crime continued to dominate the underground sports betting market, in 1961 Congress decided to
take a more aggressive approach with the Wire Act, which specifically targeted bookies and

5

Christopher C. Schwarz, supra note 1, at 50.
See Shain Roche, The Bank Is Open: An Overview of How Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association Will
Affect the NBA and Its Players, 20 J. High Tech. L. 119, 123 (2020) (Noting that states have historically regulated
lotteries.).
7 Id. at 124.
8 Id.
9 Christopher C. Schwarz, supra note 1, at 51.
10 Id.
11 See Shain Roche, supra note 6, at 124 (Bettors were still subject to criminal penalties under state laws.).
6
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organized crime.12 Further legislation arrived in 1992, when President George H.W. Bush signed
the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, or “PASPA,” into law, which prohibited
states from authorizing sports betting.13 The Act stated, “It shall be unlawful for a governmental
entity to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact, or a person
to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity
a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based, directly or
indirectly.”14 Finally, in 2006, the Wire Act was fortified by the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act of 2006, which banned those engaged in betting from knowingly accepting
payment in connection with “unlawful internet gambling.” 15 Combined, these laws, the history of
sports betting scandals, and disapproval from professional sports leagues put the future of sports
betting in serious doubt.
B. Shifting Attitudes in the Public & Legal Landscape
Opponents of sports betting have largely argued that it is a vice and immoral for several
reasons: it can become addictive, it encourages fans to root for players rather than teams, and it is
risky.16 However, given the explosion of sports betting over recent years, it is now apparent that
there is a massive market and extensive public support for sports betting, suggesting that the public
at large does not see this activity as a negative.17 Furthermore, the previous existence of a black

See 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (“Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire
communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information
assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire
communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information
assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.”).
13 28 U.S.C.A. § 3702 (West).
14 Id.
15 Keith C. Miller, Sports Betting Integrity at Risk: The Role of the Wire Act, 61 Santa Clara L. Rev. 247, 261 (2020).
16 Nicholas Burkhart & Dylan Welsh, The Legalization of Sports Gambling: An Irreparable Harm or the Beginning
of Unprecedented Growth?, 21 Sports Law. J. 145, 165 (2014).
17 Daniel J. Spitz et al., supra note 3, at 165-166.
12
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market for sports betting suggests that there has always been public support for sports betting.18
Proponents of sports betting argued that it should not be left in the shadows where it would
continue to occur, unregulated, untaxed, and untapped as a source of revenue for both states and
professional sports leagues.19
In 2011, former Governor of New Jersey Chris Christie, and proponents of sports betting,
challenged PASPA in federal court, in order to legalize sports betting, and this statute essentially
made it illegal for states to sponsor sports betting, with a few exceptions that PASPA grandfathered
into the law.20 Finally, in 2018, after ten years of litigation, the United States Supreme Court found
PASPA unconstitutional.21 However, the exponential growth of sportsbooks around the country
since PASPA’s repeal has led to some concern about sports integrity, especially regarding
basketball, given its history of integrity issues. 22
C. Sports Betting (Point-Shaving) Scandals in Basketball
1. NBA Scandals
The NBA has a tumultuous history with sports betting. Jack Molinas, an exceptional player for
the Fort Wayne Pistons in the 1950’s, was expelled from the NBA for gambling. 23 Suspicions of
Molinas’ gambling arose after a Pistons game against the Boston Celtics, where the Pistons
possessed an 11-point lead at halftime over the Celtics, who were favored by six points. 24 Molinas
received a note at halftime that read, “Joe sent me,” and the Pistons were ultimately defeated by

18

John Holden et al., supra note 4, at 73.
See id (These sports leagues have since made millions through sports betting partnerships and broadcast deals.).
20 See Keith C. Miller, supra note 15, at 261 (PASPA, when it was passed, gave New Jersey the option to grandfather
in Atlantic City, which, ironically, New Jersey opted against at the time.).
21 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484-85.
22 Nicholas Burkhart et al., supra note 16, at 153.
23 Kendall Howell, You Can Bet on It: The Legal Evolution of Sports Betting, 11 Harv. J. Sports & Ent. L. 73, 87-89
(2020).
24 See id. at 89-90 (Molinas scored 18 points in the first half.).
19
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seven points, which subsequently led to bookmakers refusing to take bets on Pistons games.25
After an NBA investigation, Molinas admitted to gambling, was immediately suspended, and was
eventually kicked out of the NBA.26
Unfortunately, the Molinas scandal is not the only blemish on the history of the NBA’s
integrity. The most notorious scandal is the Donaghy scandal in 2007, involving then-referee Tim
Donaghy, who was found to have not only bet on NBA games generally, but also the games he
worked.27 Donaghy, a referee for 13 years, provided “picks” for NBA games as part of a secret
agreement between himself, Jack Concannon, James Battista, and Thomas Martino, utilizing his
access to non-public information, such as the identity of officiating crews for upcoming games,
the interactions between certain referees and team personnel, and the physical condition of certain
players, to make the picks.28 Donaghy eventually came forward after the government discovered
his scheme, cooperated with the FBI and received 15 months in prison, and his actions decreased
public confidence in the integrity of NBA games and gave sports betting detractors a very public
example of the threat the industry poses to sports integrity.29 According to one poll conducted in
2007, 88% of respondents believed Donaghy personally affected the outcomes of games that he
officiated.30 Former NBA Commissioner David Stern called the scandal the “worst thing that could
happen to a professional sports league.”31 Therefore, it is easy to see why the NBA, historically,
has exhibited a reluctance to embrace sports betting, given the history of negative external
influences that have accompanied it.
2. NCAA Scandals

25

Kendall Howell, supra note 23, at 89-90.
Molinas v. Podoloff, 133 N.Y.S.2d 743, 744 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
27 Christopher C. Schwarz, supra note 1, at 51-52.
28 United States v. Donaghy, 570 F. Supp. 2d 411, 415-416 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
29 Id. at 416.
30 Nicholas Burkhart et al., supra note 16, at 153.
31 Id.
26
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The NBA does not have a monopoly on integrity issues with regards to the game of basketball,
as collegiate basketball has seen its fair share of scandal. One of the most infamous scandals in
NCAA history is the Boston College point-shaving scandal of the 1970’s. Point-shaving does not
necessarily mean letting the opposing team win, it means that a team intentionally fails to cover
the point spread for a game.32 For example, if a team is favored by three points to win and is
engaging in a point-shaving scandal, that team intentionally tries to win the game by less than three
points. The Perla brothers, Rocco and Anthony, lifelong gamblers, grew up with a senior on the
Boston College basketball team, Richard Kuhn.33 Kuhn, responsible for ensuring that Boston
College would fail to cover point spreads, would be paid $2,500 for each game he “fixed.” 34 After
failing to ensure that Boston College did not cover the point spread against its rival, Providence,
the Perla brothers recruited Boston College leading scorer Ernie Cobb to join the conspiracy,
leading to better results for the point-shaving scheme.35 Eventually, the scheme unraveled when
an individual involved with the Perla brothers, Henry Hill, confessed to authorities after being
arrested on unrelated drug charges.36
The scandals in NCAA history are numerous. During the 1950-51 season, the City College of
New York (CCNY), as well as 32 basketball players from seven different schools, appeared to
shave points in 86 games.37 CCNY had been lauded as the first team to ever win both the NIT
Tournament and the NCAA Tournament in the same season, but when the scheme was uncovered,
CCNY’s team fell apart and dropped to Division III status, Long Island shut down its basketball

32

Haley M. Robb, Hedge Your Bets: How the Legalization of Sports Betting Could Be the Downfall of Intercollegiate
Sports, 122 W. Va. L. Rev. 351, 372-73 (2019).
33 United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1983).
34 Id. at 74.
35 See id (Notably, the strategy succeeded in games against UCLA and Fordham.).
36 Id. at 75.
37 Haley M. Robb, supra note 32, at 373.
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program for seven years, and the University of Kentucky Basketball Team was banned from
NCAA participation for an entire season. 38
Arizona State University endured its own point-shaving scandal, when guard Stevin Smith, the
team’s best player, accrued a debt with a campus bookmaker and agreed to engage in point-shaving
to pay off his debts.39 Tulane’s basketball team engaged in its own scheme, as four starters agreed
to engage in point-shaving for two games.40
Finally, Northwestern’s basketball team got caught participating in a point-shaving scandal
during the 1994-95 season, which involved two starting players ensuring Northwestern failed to
cover the point spread in games against Penn State and Wisconsin. 41
D. Why Basketball is Particularly Susceptible to Issues of Integrity
Basketball is extremely susceptible to issues of integrity for a variety of reasons. Unlike other
major sports, such as soccer, football, and baseball, basketball involves a small number of players
actively on a court at any given time. This makes it much easier for one player to influence the
outcome of a game, especially if the player involved is the team’s star player or leading scorer, as
seen in the Boston College point-shaving scandal.42 Players in basketball simply have many more
opportunities to touch the ball during each possession than in other sports, which gives players
with bad intentions (point-shaving), more opportunities to negatively impact the game’s integrity.
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Haley M. Robb, supra note 32, at 373.
See Zachary Pekale, A bookie, a bet, a basketball player: 25 years ago, point-shaving scandal rocked Arizona State,
CRONKITE NEWS ARIZONA PBS (Dec. 11, 2018), https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/2018/12/11/point-shavingscandal-rocked-arizona-state/ (Smith ensured that the Sun Devils won consecutive games by exactly 6 points, but
eventually the scheme became obvious to ASU students and was exposed.).
40 See SI Staff, BIG TROUBLE AT TULANE: ALLEGATIONS ABOUT ANOTHER POINT SHAVING SCANDAL
HAVE ROCKED THE OFT-SCARRED WORLD OF BASKETBALL, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED VAULT (Apr. 08,
1985), https://vault.si.com/vault/1985/04/08/big-trouble-at-tulane (Tulane, including Metro Conference Player of the
Year John “Hot Rod” Williams, failed to cover the spread against Southern Mississippi and Memphis State.).
41 Pam Belluck, COLLEGE BASKETBALL; Ex-Northwestern Players Charged in Point-Shaving, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (Mar. 27, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/27/sports/college-basketball-ex-northwestern-playerscharged-in-pointshaving.html#:~:text=The%20gambling%20case%20began%20in,school's%20leading%20all%2Dtime%20rusher .
42 Burke, 700 F.2d at 74.
39
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In addition, unlike baseball, which does not involve fouls, or football, where one can commit
as many penalties as one likes without “fouling out,” basketball players in college foul out after
their fifth foul, and basketball players in the NBA foul out after their sixth foul. 43 Therefore, a
team’s leading scorer, looking to shave points, could commit two quick fouls to start a game, at
which point a coach would likely take this player out to prevent him from fouling out early in the
game, and allow the other team to build up a lead. Or, in the waning moments of a game, the player
seeking to shave points could commit a foul on purpose to stop the clock and give the other team
an opportunity to cover the point spread.
Further, the Donaghy scandal illustrated the ease with which a referee could orchestrate pointshaving in an NBA game. The referee could call quick fouls on a team’s best player, ensuring he
will be sent to the bench early. Referees could also call strategic fouls, such as “illegal defense,” a
rarely called foul that would force a team to play less aggressive defense once called. 44 Coaches
too could engage in point-shaving by benching their best players for longer stretches than usual,
calling timeouts at inopportune moments, or drawing up poorly designed plays to ensure their team
does not score at key junctures in the game. These strategies could easily influence the scores of
basketball game. Therefore, basketball is extremely susceptible to point-shaving from a variety of
angles.
Given the history of scandals involving sports betting and the game of basketball in the United
States at the college and professional level, concerns about the integrity of the game in and around

See Marsha Green, Here’s What to Know About Fouls in NCAA Basketball, NBC SAN DIEGO (Mar. 23, 2022),
https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/sports/heres-what-to-know-about-fouls-in-ncaabasketball/2902802/#:~:text=If%20the%20player%20reaches%20a,NBA%2C%20which%20takes%20six%20fouls
(However, players in any major sport can be ejected for unsportsmanlike conduct.).
44 See Scott Eden, From the archives: How former ref Tim Donaghy conspired to fix NBA games, ESPN (Jul. 9, 2020),
https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/25980368/how-former-ref-tim-donaghy-conspired-fix-nba-games (The former
illegal defense rule, now eliminated, essentially made it illegal for teams to play a “zone” defense, which involves
defenders being assigned spots on the court rather than actively guarding a player at all times of the defensive
possession.).
43
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where sports betting is legal are not unfounded. Sports betting impacts the game of basketball from
a fan standpoint because it adds monetary incentives and creates a kind of “game within a game”
as “prop bets” on player statistics become more popular.45 The downside of introducing this
monetary component into the game of basketball, as history illustrates, is that it introduces bad
actors who seek to take advantage of the sports betting system by bribing players and officials. In
the past, this has led to players and referees adjusting their play and decision-making processes to
prioritize cash over basketball.46 This is a real risk that has had major consequences on the integrity
of NCAA and NBA games, which is why appropriate safeguards have been adopted by many states
via regulations and why the NBA has contracted with integrity watchdogs to monitor suspicious
betting line movements. However, the fact remains that the game of basketball, notably at the NBA
level, is particularly susceptible to integrity issues stemming from negative external influences
caused by sports betting.
E. Professional Sports Leagues’ Shifting Attitudes
In 2007, amid the Donaghy crisis, NBA Vice President Rick Buchanan said, “The harms
caused by the government endorsement of sports betting far exceed the alleged benefits,” but, in
2014, the NBA did an “about-face,” as Commissioner Adam Silver stated, “Sports betting should
be brought out of the underground and into the sunlight where it can be appropriately monitored
and regulated.”47 Silver specifically called for monitoring of unusual betting line movements,
licensing integrity watchdogs, and adopting a federal framework.48 The NBA has since become
equity partners with FanDuel Sportsbook and has also partnered with MGM.49 As a whole, the

45

Prop bets allow bettors to wager on individualized player statistics (for example, one could bet on Carmelo Anthony
to score 20 points in a game).
46 Donaghy, 570 F. Supp. at 415-416.
47 Id. at 160.
48 Id.
49 John Holden et al., supra note 4, at 34.
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progression of the NBA’s attitude towards sports betting can be described as an intense opposition
that evolved into a mild skepticism, which has since morphed into an open acceptance. 50
Professional sports leagues’ attitudes have mirrored public sentiment, which strongly favors
sports betting, partnering with companies such as FanDuel and DraftKings in order to obtain
revenue from fantasy sports in particular. 51 Fantasy sports involve payment of a fee to join a
fantasy league.52 The league participants “draft” players to their teams, and, each week of the
season, teams receive points for how well their players perform, competing against another fantasy
team.53 Fantasy sports have been an exceptional tool with regards to boosting fan engagement, as,
even when game scores are out of hand or two bad teams are playing each other, fans continue to
watch the games in order to see how their fantasy players perform. 54 Therefore, professional sports
leagues have demonstrated that their priority is fan engagement, regardless of whether that equates
to fan loyalty to players or fan loyalty to teams.
The NBA’s attitude adjustment towards betting is not difficult to understand. Months after the
Murphy decision, the NBA partnered with MGM, the first partnership between a professional
sports association and a major gambling operator in the United States. 55 The partnership is a threeyear deal worth $25 million and allocates 1% of the total amount of money bet on NBA games via
MGM’s systems to the NBA.56 In return, the NBA will supply MGM with official data and
promote MGM resorts across the NBA’s online platforms. 57 The NBA, perhaps seeing a

50

Grant Ellfeldt, Be Honest with Me: How Federal Regulation of Sports Gambling Must Protect the Integrity of the
Game, 40 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 89, 91 (2020).
51 Id. at 96.
52 Id. at 95.
53 See id (At the end of season, the team with the most points, or most wins against other teams, wins, depending on
how the league is set up.).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 139.
56 Id. at 139-140.
57 Id.
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tremendous market of untapped potential with regards to sports betting, leaped at the opportunity
to secure strategic partnerships. This is a stark change from the days when former NBA
Commissioner David Stern argued that allowing sports betting would “turn fans into gamblers who
cheer only for players, teams, and bets rather than their hometown favorite.” 58 Stern also warned
that this deterioration of the bond between team and fan would cause irreparable harm to the
NBA.59 Senator Bill Bradley, a former NBA player and PASPA proponent, warned that sports
would become more about money than personal achievement and sportsmanship, and he feared
that sports betting would alter the way young people view professional athletes, who have
traditionally served as role models to children. 60 The relationship between the NBA and sports
betting has come a long way.
F. Integrity Fees & Watchdogs
The NBA’s commitment to sports betting has developed in tandem with the desire to charge
state-licensed sportsbooks “integrity fees” through its partnerships with integrity watchdogs. 61
These integrity fees, which involve state-licensed sportsbooks purchasing “official data” from the
NBA, are estimated to secure $2 billion in revenue for the NBA.62 For example, one proposed
Indiana bill in 2018 read, “A sports wagering operator shall remit to a sports governing body…an
integrity fee of one percent (1%) of the amount wagered on the sports governing body’s sporting
events.”63 NBA Commissioner Adam Silver, when asked why the NBA would charge integrity
fees, responded that the NBA’s motive was twofold: to protect the integrity of the game and to

58

Nicholas Burkhart et al., supra note 16, at 165.
Id.
60 Kendall Howell, supra note 23, at 97.
61 See John Holden et al., supra note 4, at 35-36 (These are essentially taxes on bets placed to cover the costs for
ensuring that the data and games are not compromised by integrity issues and bad actors.).
62 Id. at 36.
63 Id. at 37.
59
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compensate the NBA for its “intellectual property.” 64 Furthermore, NBA Executive Vice President
Dan Spillane stated, “To compensate leagues for the risk and expense created by betting…we
believe it is reasonable for operators to pay each league 1% of the total amount bet on its games.”65
It appears that the NBA’s integrity fee idea is a driving force behind its shift in attitude towards
sports betting. The NBA is now attempting to charge integrity fees to sportsbooks in each state
where sports betting is legal to further supplement its sports betting revenue.66
The NBA has also partnered with integrity watchdogs, such as Sportradar and Genius Sports,
which are third-party companies that monitor sports betting lines for irregularities and also sell
data to bookmakers.67 These companies notify customers, such as the NBA, about suspicious
activities.68 The watchdogs are able to pick up on these irregularities by using a variety of tools,
such as utilizing fraud detection systems, employing teams of skilled analysists to monitor live
betting lines, and maintaining strong relationships with law enforcement around the county.69
Other tools used by watchdogs include using predictive algorithms to catch betting irregularities,
creating integrity training programs for professional sports leagues’ employees, and launching indepth investigations to get to the root cause of integrity breaches. 70 The watchdogs contract with
professional sports leagues, such as the NBA, and sell their “official league data,” collected from
leagues’ data scouts and journalists, to sportsbooks.71 So, the partnerships between the NBA and
these watchdogs allows the league to require sportsbooks to purchase official NBA data through

64

Prince Grimes, Adam Silver on the future of sports betting and the NBA, SPORTS WASHINGTON (May 29, 2021),
https://www.nbcsports.com/washington/wizards/adam -silver-applauds-mse-sportsbook-explains-nbas-stancegambling.
65 John Holden et al., supra note 4, at 39.
66 Daniel J. Spitz et al., supra note 3, at 161.
67 John Holden et al., supra note 4, at 35.
68 Id. at 47-48.
69 Monitoring & Detection: What we Offer, SPORTRADAR,
https://integrity.sportradar.com/anti-matchfixing/monitoring-and-detection//.
70 Put integrity at your core, GENIUS SPORTS (2022), https://geniussports.com/sportstech/integrity/.
71 Id. at 49.
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these integrity watchdogs, selling sportsbooks on the idea of secure data and charging an integrity
fee in the process. This business model provides the NBA with additional revenue and promotes
integrity, a win-win for the league.
III.

ANALYSIS

A. States Should Continue to Regulate Sports Betting
To ensure the integrity of basketball games, which are particularly susceptible to integrity
issues, at all levels of competition, the states should continue to regulate sports betting with sports
integrity watchdogs and implement a competitive bidding process. States have been doing a good
job at experimenting with legislation to ensure the integrity of sports betting, adopting a wide
variety of regulations that have been successful and are tailored to each state’s unique needs. This
makes states the best option to ensure the integrity of basketball games. While the states have been
doing a very good job at integrity monitoring, however, additional safeguards cannot hurt,
especially given the history of integrity issues in basketball games, and a competitive bidding
process as well as the utilization of integrity watchdogs would only add more layers of security
with respect to the sports betting data.
The trend of state acceptance of sports betting is unsurprising. The legalization of sports
betting possesses both public and private support, as evidenced by the enthusiasm of professional
sports leagues to capitalize on revenue-earning opportunities and the public’s willingness to spend
money betting on sports in massive quantities. This makes the legalization of sports betting
extremely popular politically. By August 2018, the same year that Murphy was decided, 30 states
had already legalized or began the process of legalizing sports betting, and in the first 18 months
following the repeal of PASPA alone, states received $100 million in tax revenue. 72 Sports betting

72

Daniel J. Spitz et al., supra note 3, at 165-166.
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attracts a tremendous audience and is bringing a new kind of excitement to sporting events; being
able to bet on the winner of games, the point spread, and on player props creates a kind of “gamewithin-a-game.” This enthusiasm was on full display in New York in January, 2022, as gross
gaming revenue was over $112 million for the month alone.73 Not only was the gross gaming
revenue massive, but the handle, or total amount wagered, in New York for January, 2022 was
nearly $1.7 billion.74 Since 2018, when sports betting was legalized, the gross sportsbook revenue
in New Jersey is over $1.8 billion, over $1 billion in Pennsylvania, and close to $885,000 in
Illinois.75 In total, gross sportsbook revenue is close to $9.5 billion, with states collecting close to
$1.5 billion in taxes.76 Therefore, many states have jumped at the opportunity to legalize sports
betting.77
B. Avoid Further Costly Litigation
To best ensure that NBA games maintain their integrity amid the advent of sports betting,
states should continue to regulate sports betting, as they have been very successful implementing
a wide array of regulations that have done a good job of ensuring the integrity of sports betting. In
the wake of Murphy, the states have taken the wheel with regards to regulation of sports betting.
The road to get to this point was costly and time-consuming, and a shift to federal regulation would

73

Ulrik Boesen, Large Spread in Tax Treatment of Sports Betting Operators, TAX FOUNDATION (Feb. 9, 2022),
https://taxfoundation.org/sports-betting-tax-treatment/.
74 Chris Altruda, Legal US Sports Betting Revenue, Handle, And Tax Totals Since PASPA Repeal , SPORTSHANDLE
(June 10, 2022), https://sportshandle.com/sports-betting-revenue/.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 One suggestion of the pro-federal regulation syndicate has been to create a federal enforcement agency, similar to
the SEC, to directly bring claims against infringers of sports betting laws. This suggestion would be extremely costly,
as it would involve the creation of a federal agency that would have to monitor, regulate, and enforce penalties for
non-compliance, all of which would be paid for by the American taxpayer. Furthermore, given the drawn -out
litigations involved in Christie and Murphy, federal regulation of sports betting, which just became state-regulated in
2018, would likely reignite litigation concerning federalism and the anti-commandeering doctrine.
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likely lead to legal retaliation from the states, such as New Jersey, that fought hard to legalize
sports betting and reap its tax revenues.78
C. State Regulation Accounts for States’ Unique Needs
States’ needs and economic situations are unique and should therefore be individualized
with regards to sports betting regulations, and this is highlighted by the legislative experimentation
the 30 states that have legalized sports betting have undertaken, resulting in a wide array of
regulations that vary from state to state. For example, Pennsylvania utilizes a regulation that states,
“Each sports wagering certificate holder shall report to the department and pay from its daily gross
sports wagering revenue, on a form and in the manner prescribed by the department, a tax of 34%
of its daily gross sports wagering revenue.”79 On the other hand, West Virginia imposes a
regulation on sports betting that reads, “For the privilege of holding a license to operate sports
wagering under this article, the state shall impose and collect ten percent of the licensee’s adjusted
gross sports wagering receipts from the operation of West Virginia Lottery sports wagering.”80
The disparities between some states’ tax rates are colossal, as New York, New Hampshire and
Rhode Island all tax at a rate of 51% of gross gaming revenue, while Nevada and Iowa tax at a
mere 6.75% rate.81 Other notable differences in tax rates include high-level taxing states such as
Delaware, which taxes at a 50% rate, and Tennessee, which taxes at a 20% rate, and low-level
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See Daniel J. Spitz et al., supra note 3, at 166 (Of note, the Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of 2018, which
would have created a framework for federal regulation of sports betting, was proposed twice in Congress but failed to
gain any traction, as it did not make it out of committee due to the first session ending. Still, the fact that this proposed
legislation failed to catch on underscores the lack of support for federal regulation of sports betting. The proposed
framework, which would have established a federal agency, “National Sports Wagering Clearinghouse,” to collect
and distribute information, would have allowed states to “opt in” to a federal regulatory scheme, but it is unclear how
much revenue states would have received from sports betting, if any . Given how hard states fought to secure the
legalization of sports betting and the immense profits states have generated from regulating it, it is hard to see why
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taxing states such as Michigan, which taxes at a 8.4% rate, and South Dakota, which taxes at a 9%
rate.82 These are policy choices that will have different effects on how sports gambling develops
and grows locally.83 A uniform federal regulatory scheme, such as the one proposed under the
failed “Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act,” would not account for the individualized nature of
states and their people.
Each state should be free to regulate how it sees fit to account for unique economic,
geographic, and political needs, but the existing regulations in several states contain a few
characteristics that are extremely creative with regards to safeguarding sports integrity, and states
seeking to legalize sports betting should seriously consider adopting them. For example, Michigan
has a sports betting regulation that mandates immediate notification to the Michigan Gaming
Control Board of any defects or malfunctions regarding a sports betting platform, requires
maintenance of records for a minimum of 5 years, and empowers the Gaming Control Board to
require the platform to discontinue usage in the state.84 This procedure ensures that any integrity
issues are promptly reported, that records are available for examination should a pattern of
irregularities begin to occur, and that the sports betting platform is accountable to a higher
authority, incentivizing platforms to ensure everything is running smoothly.
In Colorado, the legislature created a regulation that ensures that taxpayers will reap the
rewards of sports betting, not pay for its regulation. The Colorado regulation mandates an annual
“Sports Betting Operations Fee,” calculated using several factors, that covers the administrative
and personnel costs of regulating sports betting “to ensure that tax revenue from net sports betting
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proceeds is directed to intended beneficiaries.”85 This system ensures that taxpayers are rewarded,
not penalized, by the legalization of sports betting.
Mississippi mandates that licensees “adopt approved internal controls to identify wagers
which may indicate cheating, manipulation, interference, with the regular conduct of the sport, or
violations of the integrity of any sport on which wagers were made.” 86 The regulation also requires
that licensees report integrity issues or suspicions within 12 hours to the Executive Director of the
Mississippi Gaming Commission, who retains power to void or suspend betting and to report the
issues to law enforcement or sports’ governing bodies. 87 This regulation creates a link for reporting
integrity violations between the Gaming Commission and law enforcement, ensuring integrity
violations are taken seriously by sportsbooks, while keeping sports leagues, such as the NBA, in
the loop.
New Jersey states that, “an operator will immediately report to the division any criminal or
disciplinary proceedings commenced against the operator in connection with its operations, any
abnormal betting activity or patterns that may indicate a concern about the integrity of a sports
event, any potential breach of a sports governing body’s rules or codes of conduct that pertain to
sports wagering, any conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of a sports event for purposes of
financial gain, including but not limited to match fixing, and suspicious or illegal wagering
activities, including the use of funds derived from illegal activity, using agents to place wagers, or
using false identification.”88 New Jersey also requires that, “An operator will maintain records of
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sports wagering operations in accordance with regulations promulgated by the division.”89
Therefore, New Jersey possesses strong safeguards against any irregular betting activities and
demands that sportsbook operators keep a paper trail to track any suspicious activity.
In Tennessee, “Licensees shall share with the council, in real time and at the account level,
information regarding a bettor, amount and type of bet, the time the bet was placed, the location
of the bet, including the internet protocol address if applicable, the outcome of the bet, and records
of abnormal betting activity.”90 Therefore, Tennessee mandates that licensees immediately report
any suspicious activity so that potential corruption is weeded out as quickly as possible.
In Iowa, “With the approval of the commission, a licensee under section 99F.7A shall
cooperate with investigations conducted by sports governing bodies, including but not limited to
providing or facilitating the provision of account-level betting information and audio or video files
relating to persons placing wagers. However, a licensee shall not share information that would
interfere with an ongoing criminal investigation.”91 Therefore, Iowa makes clear to licensees that
cooperation with sports leagues, such as the NBA, is not encouraged, but mandatory, in order to
best ensure the integrity of sports betting.
Finally, Virginia provides an avenue of communication between sports’ governing bodies
and the director of the Virginia Lottery, as, if a sport’s governing body has a “good faith,
reasonable basis to believe such restriction, limitation, or prohibition is reasonably necessary to
protect the integrity or the public’s confidence in the integrity of the sport’s governing body,” the
sport’s governing body, such as the NBA, may contact the director of the Virginia Lottery and
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request that the director restrict or prohibit bets on sporting events offered by a permit holder.92
Therefore, the Virginia regulation creates an integrity safeguarding process for the NBA to follow,
as, should one of the NBA’s integrity watchdogs detect an irregularity in betting patterns,
communication with the state will rectify the situation and address any integrity concerns.
Virginia’s sport betting regulation also mandates that, within 90 days of beginning operations and
on an annual basis, permit holders engage in independent laboratory testing regarding system
security and integrity.93
As illustrated by these laws, there are many smart and effective processes already put in
place by state regulations. States looking to legalize sports betting should look to these laws when
crafting their own regulations, as they possess creative ideas for creating a strong integrity
monitoring system, establishing a link between law enforcement and state regulatory boards, and
bringing the NBA to the table as well.94 Mississippi, Iowa, and Virginia, in particular, have shown
that states are accounting for integrity issues that sports, particularly basketball, have had by
establishing clear protocols and/or lines of communication between the NBA and the states, their
gaming boards, and/or their licensees. Therefore, states are having no trouble coming up with
effective methods to regulate sports betting in a way that is inclusive of law enforcement and sports
leagues, making state regulation the best way to ensure the integrity of basketball games.95
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1. Data Should be Provided to Sportsbooks Via a Competitive Bidding Process
The NBA has been extremely vocal about the need for integrity fees to ensure that its games
retain their integrity.96 However, there are two major issues with integrity fees: NBA data is not
proprietary and using a single source for data increases, rather than decreases, the likelihood of
source corruption. The NBA continues to push hard for the utilization of integrity fees, as integrity
fees would generate an enormous amount of revenue for the league.97 In an interview during which
the NBA’s Vice President and head of Fantasy and Gaming, Scott Kaufman-Ross, was asked what
“actual and tangible costs” integrity fees would be going toward, Kaufman-Ross responded, “I
want to be clear that the fee is not just about the cost. It’s about the fact that it’s our product.” 98
This highlights the NBA’s underlying motive in pushing states to adopt integrity fees: compensate
the NBA for the data it creates, such as game scores and player statistics.
Courts consistently have held that sports data is not proprietary, and the seminal case relating
to the NBA is Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc.99 In Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola,
Motorola appealed a permanent injunction concerning a pager sold by Motorola, called
“SportsTrax,” that gave live updates on basketball statistics, including the teams playing, score
changes, the team in possession of the ball, whether a team is in the free-throw bonus, the quarter
of the game, and the time left in the quarter. 100 The court held that Motorola’s transmission of realtime NBA game scores and statistics did not constitute a misappropriation of NBA property, as
Congressional legislation passed in 1976 protected broadcasts of live performances, such as
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sporting events, but not the underlying events themselves. 101 The court also noted that there was
no evidence that anyone used SportsTrax as a substitute for attending NBA games or watching the
games on television.102 Courts have ruled that sports data is not proprietary in the context of
Fantasy Sports and other sports, such as football, as well. 103
Proponents of integrity fees contend that the NBA should be compensated if sportsbooks and
casinos are making money by using NBA statistics.104 However, that data is not proprietary and
the NBA is, therefore, not legally entitled to compensation for its statistics. The NBA itself seems
to have come to this realization, which may explain why it has dropped its integrity fee asking
price from 1% to 0.25%.105 Furthermore, the NBA makes millions of dollars through sportsbook
and casino partnerships and is therefore making money in the sports betting market regardless. 106
The utilization of integrity fees in each state would mean that all data used by sportsbooks
would come from a single source: the NBA. 107 This would actually threaten the integrity of NBA
games rather than protect it, as, if state-licensed sportsbooks were to exclusively utilize NBA data,
this would mean that there would be a single data source that hackers and those looking to corrupt
NBA games could target.108 Any data source can be hacked, which means, should the NBA be the
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sole data source, if there is just one security breach, the entire NBA betting market would suffer
rather than one sportsbook’s data source.109 Utilizing the NBA as the sole data source also gives
an opportunity to bad actors, such as Tim Donaghy, to wield an incredible amount of power and
do significant damage should they choose to do so. It is also ironic that the NBA, pushing for
adoption of its official data from a single source in order to ensure integrity, is partnered with
integrity watchdogs that employ algorithms that rely on multiple sources of data in order to monitor
betting irregularities.110 Therefore, to reduce this risk of corruption, states should allow for a
competitive bidding process where sportsbooks choose the highest bidder among data companies,
ensuring that there is diversification of data sources throughout the states. This bidding process
would be beneficial to all parties, as multiple data companies could get in on the bidding process,
sportsbooks would be paid more, and states would be able to regulate sports betting within their
borders how they see fit. So, a competitive bidding process is the best way to ensure the integrity
of NBA sports betting.
Proponents of integrity fees argue that, by paying these fees, the NBA can use the money to
monitor and ensure that the sole data source is not corrupted.111 In the interview discussed above,
NBA Vice President and head of Fantasy and Gaming, Scott Kaufman-Ross, stated that one of the
reasons why the NBA wants to charge integrity fees is to set up a “best-in-class integrity and
monitoring system…something we can’t do right now because it will take a multi-state view.”112
However, the NBA, without being paid integrity fees, already was responsible for monitoring and
ensuring the integrity of its games. The NBA possesses a clear interest in ensuring its games are
legitimate so that its reputation is not undermined. Also, the NBA has already partnered with
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integrity watchdogs to monitor betting lines for any irregularities. 113 Therefore, it is unclear why
more money is needed to create a “best-in-class monitoring system.” Professional sports leagues,
for the most part, have managed to protect the integrity of their games for decades without third party contractors and private monitoring companies, and now the NBA has the help of these third
parties under contract.114 Furthermore, professional sports leagues previously ensured the integrity
of their games without this added assistance during times in which sports betting was largely an
unregulated black market, meaning all of the regulatory safeguards that are present today were not
there to help them.115 Kaufman-Ross has acknowledged such, stating, “When that data is available
in a transparent market, it allows us to build better models and have access and insights into what’s
happening, which puts us in a better position to do all the things we need to do.”116
Finally, another argument made in favor of paying integrity fees to the NBA is that, should the
NBA become the sole data source for NBA sports betting, it would encourage cooperation between
the federal government and the NBA, which could make regulation and integrity monitoring much
easier.117 However, sportsbooks are not required to obtain their data from the NBA, which means
the NBA is not the only data source that needs to be regulated. State regulation and enforcement
of penalties would be much more effective, as, rather than have taxpayers in states that have not
even legalized sports betting pay to have sports betting regulated in other states, only states that
receive revenue from sports betting would be responsible for its regulation and enforcement of
penalties.

113

John Holden et al., supra note 4, at 34.
Id.
115 It also bears mentioning that there is much less incentive today for players to accept bribes from orchestrators of
point-shaving schemes than there was in the 1900s, as players today make millions of dollars compared to the modest
salaries that players used to be paid decades ago.
116 Chris Mannix, How the League Went on Defense, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 9, 2021),
https://www.si.com/betting/2021/08/09/gambling-issue-the-leagues.
117 Grant Ellfeldt, supra note 50, at 90.
114

25
2. Implement Integrity Watchdogs to Monitor Data
The fact that integrity fees should not be paid to the NBA does not mean that integrity
watchdogs cannot be utilized as an additional safety net to ensure that games remain legitimate.
The NBA, which is making millions from its partnerships with sportsbooks and casinos, has voiced
its concerns regarding the integrity of its games. 118 Therefore, the NBA should continue its
partnerships with integrity watchdogs such as Sportradar and Genius Sports. 119
Sportradar has enjoyed success with European basketball, signing a 2-year deal with
easyCredit BBL, also known as Basketball Bundesliga, and monitors over 350 games.120
Sportradar utilizes the Integrity Services’ “Intelligence & Investigation” and “Education &
Prevention” tools to guard against match fixing in the Slovak Basketball Leagues with the help of
a global team of qualified integrity experts that report irregularities to leagues’ governing
bodies.121 Sportradar possesses several impressive tools that are utilized to combat integrity issues.
The Fraud Detection System monitors the worldwide global betting market via a sophisticated
algorithm, containing an extensive historical database and possessing “close relationships with law
enforcement agencies and police around the world.” 122 In each case where fraudulent activity is
suspected, “a comprehensive report is compiled within 72 hours, providing an excellent platform
for any potential disciplinary proceedings or criminal investigations into match-fixing.”123
Sportradar tracks the odds movements at “over 600 independent bookmakers,” and state lotteries

118

Daniel J. Spitz et al., supra note 3, at 160.
Shain Roche, supra note 6, at 139-140.
120 Sportradar to Monitor Basketball Competitions for European League Organisations , THE SPORTS INTEGRITY
INITIATIVE (Nov.
5, 2021), https://www.sportsintegrityinitiative.com/sportradar-to-monitor-basketballcompetitions-for-european-league-organisations/.
121 Id.
122 Monitoring & Detection: What we Offer, supra note 69.
123 Id.
119

26
are tracked in real-time in order to detect any anomalous betting patterns, generating an alert when
bookmakers’ odds change by greater than the pre-defined parameters.124
Genius Sports employs its own techniques to monitor data integrity, comparing how odds
move in real time, utilizing a predictive algorithm, and launching in-depth investigations to get to
the root cause of irregularities.125 Genius Sports also stresses the importance of integrity education
and training, utilizing an e-portal on its website that formalizes integrity training and uses
workshops to provide expert training.126
While diversification of data streams would help ensure the integrity of NBA games by
preventing a single data source from being corrupted, this does not mean that the threat of
corruption would disappear altogether. This is where companies such as Sportradar and Genius
Sports come into play. These companies could simply monitor betting irregularities in relation to
NBA games, and, if an issue were to arise, the watchdog could notify the state where the
irregularity occurred. The state would then work with the sportsbook and its data provider and
would have the power to enforce penalties under state law. States have an incentive to make sure
corruption and fraud are not occurring within their borders, giving them a strong motive to take
these watchdogs seriously and cooperate with them. Furthermore, there is nothing preventing
states from utilizing watchdogs themselves or requiring data providers to utilize these watchdogs
as a way of bolstering sports betting integrity.
IV.
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The best way to ensure the integrity of NBA games involves state regulation of sports betting,
a diversified stream of data sources with regards to sportsbooks, and the utilization of integrity
watchdogs as safeguards. State regulation of sports betting will allow for states to continue to reap
the tax benefits of regulating sports betting, allow for individualized state-by-state regulatory
schemes that reflect the unique needs of states and their citizens, and avoid federal bureaucratic
redtape. Diversified data streams will make bad actors less powerful, reduce the risk of corruption,
and promote a competitive bidding process that will benefit states and sportsbooks. Integrity
watchdogs should continue to be utilized by the NBA to monitor betting irregularities and report
issues to the states and sportsbooks, which can monitor compromised data sources and take
appropriate remedial measures.
This plan makes everyone a winner. The states continue to regulate sports betting and therefore
continue to receive significant revenue from taxing sports betting. Data companies are free to bid
to provide sportsbooks with statistics in the states they so desire. Sportsbooks obtain more revenue
by selection of the highest bidder. Integrity watchdogs continue to be compensated for their work.
The public would benefit from being able to bet on and enjoy NBA games with confidence that
everything possible is being done to maintain the integrity of the games. Finally, the NBA is a
winner, as, although it will not be compensated for the propriety of its data, it can still bid to
provide data to sportsbooks. Furthermore, the integrity of NBA games is maintained, ensuring fan
confidence, reducing the risk of corruption, and producing a better product that will generate more
revenue. Therefore, this plan is the best possible way to maintain the integrity of NBA games.

